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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
EARL W. SADLEIR,
Plaintiff and ResP'owdent,

-vs.-

Case No. 8374

MELVIN G. KNAPTON,
Defendmnt and App eUwnt.
1

APPELLANT'S BRIEF·

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment on a verdict
awarding plaintiff $8000.00 general and $2000.00 punitive damages in an action for ·alienation of affections.
The appeal raises for the first time in this jurisdiction,
so far as we are advised, the applicability of Section
30-3-9, Utah Code Awrwtated 1953, to such an action.

By the statute the guilty party in a divorce action forfeits all rights acquired by the marriage. It will he con-
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tended that the right of a husband to sue for alienation
of affections is a right arising out of the marital relationship and is forfeited by him if he is the guilty party
in a divorce action.
The plaintiff was divorced by his wife just prior to
the commencement of this action. The interlocutory
decree was entered on February 26, 1954 (Exhibit 1-D).
The, complaint herein was filed March 27, 1954 (R. 2).
In the divorce action, which was by default after personal service, it was found by F'inding No. IV of Exhibit
1-D:
"That since the marriage between plain tiff
and defendant, defendant has continually belittled
plaintiff in front of their friends and has refused
to make family decisions without first consulting
his parents, and during the marriage has failed
and refused to make those decisions which a husband and father should make concerning family
affairs and that this conduct has caused plaintiff
to lose all respect for defendant and has made
it impossible for plaintiff to live with defendant
as husband and wife. This conduct on the part
of defendant has interferred with raising of the
children and it has made it difficult for plaintiff
and defendant to get along together and has
caused numerous fights in front of the childre!l,
and this has caused plaintiff to become nervous
and C'aused her great mental distress."
The plaintiff Sadleir, 28 years old at the time of
the trial of the instant case (R. 46), was married on
June 19, 1947, to Vera Smith, who subsequent to the
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3
divorce action heeame married to Knapton, the defendant herein. There are two daughters, one 3 and one 5,
as the issue of the Sadleir marriage (R. 11). On the
8th or 9th of January, 1954 (R. 43-44), Knapton stated
to the plaintiff, in effect, that he, Knapton, had an affection for Vera and wanted to marry her, and that if
she would leave the plaintiff he would support her
through the time that it takes to get a divorce decree
and would pay for the divorce. Sadleir testified that
he did not "think it was right" and ordered Knapton
out of the house (R. 29). Sadleir then took his wife and
children to his mother's home to tell his mother that
Vera was leaving. He then took them to Vera's sister's
home and left them there. The next morning Vera's
parents took Vera and the children to Wendover for a
short time after which the divorce proceedings were
commenced (R. 31).
Sadleir was represented by counsel at the time of
the divorce and sat in court during his wife's testimony
(R. 36). He heard her criticize the marriage and heard
her say with reference to him "His folks have been in
on everything we did, everything we bought; we had to
get their approval on practically everything we did."
(R. 37) and heard her testify: "Q. And, as a result,
Mrs. Sadleir, have you lost all respect for your husband?
A. Yes, he doesn't seem to be much -of a man to get out
on his own and try and make us a living and a home.
He has always had to have their okay." (R. 39-40).
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The children, in 8adleir's presence, were awarded
by the court, without protest on Sadleir's part, to Vera.
(R. 41). 'Sadleir's mother was in court at the time of
the divorce and heard Vera's testimony (R. 68), which
testimony was received in evidence in the instant case
(Exhibit 2-P). Mrs. Reva Sadleir, the mother of the
plaintiff, lived directly across the street from the home
occupied by Vera and Earl (R. 71) and attended the
divorce proceedings with her two sons (R. 71) as onlookers (R. 70).
There were no quarrels between the plaintiff and
his wife over Knapton and no words about him (R. 27).
Between Christmas and the 6th or 7th of January, 1954,
Vera became moody and S.adleir contacted Knapton,
who he talked to in front of the Kearns Building in Salt
Lake. Sadleir asked Knapton what was going on between
him and Vera and asked if he loved her. Knapton is
alleged to have answered that he did but that if Sadleir
could make a horne of it he, Knapton, "would he willing
to back out and get out of it". Sadleir then asked Knapton if he would go to S.adleir's home within the next day
or so and tell Vera that he, Knapton, did not love her
and that he would get out. Sadleir testified that Knapton said he would. ''* * * he said he would hack me up,

* * * to try and convince my wife to stay home in her
own home, to make a family of her own and stay that
way." (R. 27-28). When Knapton did meet with Sadleir
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

I

I

---~--------------------------------------------------

5
and his wife on about the 8th of January, 1954, Sadleir
testified that Knapton "changed his story all the way
around" and then made the statement outlined above
(R. 29).
The plaintiff and defendant were "buddies" (R.
13) since their high school days in 1942 (R. 11). They
were both in the same unit in the Navy, occupied the
same living quarters at various Naval Stations, went
through the smne schooling together, pursued the same
Naval assignment, took their liberties and offduty time
together, were discharged from the same station in 1946
and returned together to Salt Lake City (R. 12, 17).
The friendship between Sadleir and Knapton continued on a remarkably close basis after their discharr5e
from the Navy. They went on camping trips together
with their respective families, they jointly celebrated
the birthdays of everyone in the two families and the
friendship continued on after Sadleir's marriage (R. 1819). Knapton had the "free run'' of the 'Sadleir home
(R. 19-20). Sadleir's work as a Postal Clerk resulted
in unusual hours and Knapton would be in the Sadleir
home on numerous occasions during

Sadleir~s

absence

(R. 19-22). When asked on direct examination if Vera
withdrew her affection from him during the period from
May 1953 until December of that year, Sadleir testified
"Oh, she was a little mopy at times, but, then, that was
the same as she always had been. I thought we had: a
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6
happy family." (R. 26). Sadleir and his wife continued
to have family relations up until Christmas of 1954 and
the holiday season was a happy occasion (R. 26-27).
Except for the first two months of the marriage
Sadleir and his wife lived on Southwest Temple Street
in Salt Lake City directly across the street from Sadleir's
mother and father, with Sadleir's brother and his wife
on the North, a Mr. and Mrs. Arbogast on the South and
a Mr. and Mrs. Oakley next door to Sadleir's mother's
home. The home of Vera's mother and father, during
a part of the time at least, was some two blocks away
(R. 18-19, 39).
During May 1953 Sadleir was told that his mother
had ordered Knapton out of the former's home, for
which 'Sadleir criticized his mother (R. 24-25) and told
his mother to mind her own business (R. 44). Vera is
alleged to have said to Hadleir's mother in connection
with this incident that they were "a happy threesome"
and were intending to make it a "foursome", but that
Sadleir's mother said to Sadleir that Knapton would be

1

his worst enemy (R. 25). Mrs. Arbogast, 11rs. Oakley

I

and Cleo Torgerson, a daughter of Mrs. Oakley, all testi-

.

fied to having seen Knapton through an open window
in a lighted room with his arms around Vera (R. 54, 58,
77, 85). Sadleir's mother testified that her son and Knapton were as close to each other as brothers (R. 60).
There was no evidence of criminal conversation. Vera's
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state of mind was reflected only by the divorce proceedings. Neither she nor the defendant Knapton testified
in the instant case.
The defendant moved for a directed verdict at the
close of the plaintiff's case without submitting any evidence (R. 103-105) after the plaintiff introduced phonograph records, gifts of Knapton to both of the Sadleirs,
and which on occasions were played in the presenee of
each of them (R·. 101-102). Defendant's motion for judgment in accordance with his motion for directed verdid,
or in the alternative for a new trial (R. 136) was thereafter denied (R. 138).
STAT'EMENT OF POINTS
1. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT.
(a) BY REASON OF SECTION 30-3-9, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953.

(b) BY REASON OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE.
2. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE JURY.
(a) IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE
STATE OF PLAINTIFF'S FEELINGS AS AFFECTING THE
CHIILDREN.

(b) IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
3. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
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ARGUMENT
1. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT.
(a) BY REASON OF SECTION 30-3-9, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953.

The statute, which is identical with Section 598.16
Iowa Code 1950, reads as follows:
"When a divorce is decreed the guilty party
forfeits all rights acquired by marriage."
The only State, other than Iowa and Utah, which
has a similar statute, so far as our search has disclosed,
is Missouri, Section 452,090, Revised Statutes 1949. The
Missouri statute has been construed contrary to the construction placed upon the Iowa statute by the court of
that State and contrary to our views. See De Ford v.
Johnson, 251 Mo. 244, 158 8.W. 29,46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1083,
Ann. Cas. 1915A 344, on rehearing 177 S.W. 577 (1915).
It is conceded that in the absence of statute the general
rule is that a divorce, even where it is for the fault of
the plaintiff, does not bar or affect and is not a defense
to an action for alienation of affections. 27 Am. Jur.,
Husband and Wife, Section 577, page 179. The Iowa
case of Hamilton v. McNeill, 150 Iowa 470, 129 N.W. 480,
Ann. Cas. 1912D 604 (1911), states the rule for which
we contend but which, nevertheless, the Missouri court
in the D.e Ford case refused to follow. We will confine
our citation of authority, under this point, to the Missouri case of De Ford v. Johnson and the Iowa case of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Hamilton v. McNeill in the hopes that this court will
adopt the Iowa rule rather than the construction adopted
by Missouri.
The l\Iissouri court holds that the alienation of affections gives the husband a right of action ''as complete
and perfect as does an injury to his tangible property.
It is completed upon the perpetration of the wrong. It
does not accrue to him under or by virtue of the marriage, but under and by virtue of the violation of a personal right of his own, which gives him a claim for compensation against the wrongdoer, in which she (the wife)
can neither then nor thenceforth have any interest." The
court goes on to say (177 S.W. 577) that:
"It is no more a product of the marriage than
would be a claim against one who had wrongfully
inflicted a physical injury upon her for medicine
and medical attendance provided in the performance of his duty with respect to her cure."
The Missouri court says that the statute:
"clearly refers, in apt words, to rights and
claims which the marriage gives him, and not to
those which come from a violation of his marriage rights; to rights and claims which effect
the interests of his wife, and not to those which
exist only between himself and strangers."
(supra).
In contrast to the philosophy of the Missouri Court
Justice Weaver pointed out in the concurring opinion
in Hamilton v. McNeill that the right to maintain an
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action for damages against a person who alienates the
affections of his wife is a right peculiar to the marriage
relation "and if that marriage be dissolved because of
his fault or wrong, the statute says in effect that the
right of action which was incident thereto ends with it."
The concurring decision says that the expression all
rights as used in the statute is without limitation and
that if it should be said that the husband, nevertheless,
retained the right for alienation of affections, then the
statute would be amended "by dictum of the court."
As to the contention that the statutory provision
relates only to property rights Justice Weaver in the
Hamilton case said such an answer was "very inadequate". The Justice calls attention to the proposition
that under the laws of Iowa, and which laws in the particulars mentioned are similar if not identical to our
own, the rights acquired by a husband in the property
of his wife are inchoate only and depend for their existence upon the existence of the marriage relation at the
I

ti1ne of the wife's death "and therefore the decree which

I

dissolves the marriage has the instant effect to terminate ·all such rights." Justice Weaver then says:
"Such being the case, we may presume the
Legislature knew the statute was unnecessary ~o
protect the property right of parties to a divorce,
and this statute was intended to mean precisely
what it says. Nor does this construction of the
act work any obvious wrong to the divorced husband. If, as appellee now undertakes to say, he
was a dutiful husband who never gave his wife
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ground for the divorce which he assisted her in
obtaining and was robbed of her love by the machinations of the appellant, he had only to speak
the truth and show his hand to secure the dismissal of that action, and retain the right to salve
his wounded honor by the recovery of a cash
equivalent. As he did not choose that course, but
voluntarily elected to play the part of a husband
whose misconduct entitled his wife to a dissolution of the marriage, he ought to be content to
accept the decree which he invited, with all its
statutory trimmings."
Sadleir instituted this action less than thirty days
after he sat in court listening to his wife condemn the
marriage and her statement that she had lost all respect
for him because of matters and things entirely unrelated
to Knapton. Sadleir sat mute and permitted the court
to act on his wife's testimony and the children to be
placed in her custody and control. In maintaining the
present action he is, in effect, saying that he had the
grounds for a divorce, that his wife committed perju:ry
and that the whole court proceeding was a mockery. By
permitting Sadleir to ridicule the divorce proceedings
through this kind of an action, and under the circurnstances pointed out, the door is open for connivance,
collusion and litigation which challenges the integrity
of the judicial process. The importance of the fundamental principle herein involved transcends by far the
interests of the individual. The state is directly interested. Justice Weaver in his opinion in the Hamilton
case had this to say on that subject:
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''Concerning another question presented hy
this appeal I am ready to concede that the cat;e
before us is not one coming within the ordinary
rule of res adjudicata, which requires for its application identity of parties and subject-matter,
and I do not understand the majority opinion as
holding otherwise. But the effect of a decree •Jf
divorce is not limited to the husband and wife
who are parties thereto. The state - the public
of which these persons are a part - has a direct
interest therein. It is in the interest of good
morals and common decency that litigation involving domestic infelicity, crimination, and recrimination ·between husband and wife be limited
within the narrowest possible bounds, and in my
judgment sound public policy will be best promoted by holding that he against whom a divorce is
decreed shall not be heard in any other or collateral proceeding, whether his former wife is or is
not a party thereto, to call in question the merits
of any controversy between the former husband
'and wife which was or might have been settled
as between themselves by the decree which severed their relations."
The legislative mandate that the guilty party forfeits all rights acquired by marriage must be given Pffect. It is a statement of public policy. Justice Weaver
fits the strikingly similar factual premise into the philosophy of the statute by the following expression:
"Nor can I believe there is anything in public policy nor any principles of morals which
should impel the court to ingraft an implied ex~
ception upon the statute. The case before us is an
impressive illustration of the evils which must
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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follow the establishment of the rule for which appellee contends. The court in which a divorce
proceeding is pending affords the parties thereto
every reasonable opportunity to test the truth and
merit of their matrimonial controversies. If the
husband who is charged with misconduct justifying a dissolution of the marriage has any defense
to such accusation, or any showing to make in
palliation or mitigation, there is the place to make
it and prove it. If he seeks to justify or recrinlinate because of the misconduct of his wife there
is the place to plead it. There they stand on equal
footing, and each may be heard in person and
by witnesses, and have their respective rights and
interests guarded by counsel. When this opportunity has been given and the court has found for
one party and against the other, and adjudged one
of them guilty of such violation of the marriage
obligation as to justify a divorce, it is but simple
justice to provide that, so long as that decree remains in legal force and effect, he against whom
it is announced shall not be heard to assert any
right based upon or derived from the marriage
contract which his own wrong has terminated.
To say that a husband may submit to a divorce
on the ground of his own misconduct, and then in
a suit against a third person in which his wife is
not a party assert a right based upon the marriage relation which he has forfeited, put her character and virtue as a wife in issue, and secure
for himself what may be termed a moral reversal
of the decree rendered against him, and brand
with infamy the woman whom the court has once
vindicated, would be to announce a rule unworthy
of place in any enlightened scheme for the promotion and administration of justice."
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Divorce litigation is odious enough in the simplest
of C'ases, but when a party can .sit by and be- branded
as the guilty party without the slightest effort on his
part to show otherwise, and then turn around and become
the moving party in an alienation of affections suit surrounde'd by a cloak of judicial respectability, the odiousness becomes more intolerable. J'ustice Henriod in his
concurring decision in the case of Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1
Utah 2d 362, 267 P. 2d 759, squinted at the unsavoriness
of this kind of litigation:
"Since the main opinion reduces the punitive
damages to the figure noted, I concur. I would
have concurred more readily had such damages
been eliminated altogether and could we have
reduced substantially the compensatory damageEl.
The record reflects that plaintiff himself was not
entirely free from indiscretion, and the type of
action he pursues is frowned upon in some jurisdictions, to the point where, together with similar
actions, it has been abrogated by statute-for
obvious reasons."
At the risk of having it said that we belabor the
decision in Rantilton v. MeN eill, we feel that we must,
nevertheless, quote from the decision at length. Its
rationalization of the statute so decisively answers the
decision of the Missouri court in De Ford v. Johnson that
the case merits, in our opinion, extensive quotations.
In the Hamilton case the divorce was obtained in March
of 1906. Sometime 'after the decree of divorce the defendant married the plaintiff's former wife. Thereupon
the alienation action was brought. The defendant pleadSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ed the facts as to the rendition of a decree of divorce
against the plaintiff in favor of his wife, and averred that
by the findings of such decree the plaintiff was the guilty
party and that he had thereby forfeited all right to
maintain the alienation of affection suit. The court said:
"We think it must he said that plaintiff's
right, if any, to maintain this action, is necessarily
a right 'acquired by the marriage.' The cause of
action is one which could arise only out of and
by vi~ue of the marriage relation. On the face
of the statute, therefore, the plaintiff, having been
adjudged in the divorce decree to be the guilty
party, forfeited 'all rights acquired by the marriage.' Levins v. Sleator, 2 G. Greene, 604; Lucas
v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654; Nolin v.
Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N.E. 890, 4 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 643, 114 Am. St. Rep. 605."
It was contended, nevertheless, that thH defendant in the
alienation of affection suit was not a party to the divorce decree and is, therefore, entitled to no benefits
from the adjudication had therein. This proposition is
rationalized by the court as follows:
"The question at this point is not who shall
be the beneficiaries of the statute under consideration, but what consequences shall ensue to the
'guilty party' as adjudged in a divorce decree.
The statute has to do not only with the peculiar
and individual rights of the parties to the suit
as between themselves, but it has to do also with
the public right and the public interest. If the
Legislature deemed it to the public interest, and
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so enacted, that in case of divorce the guilty party
should forfeit 'all rights acquired by the marriage,' we know of no rule that would permit such
forfeiture to he avoided by a showing that such
forfeiture would operate to the benefit in a negative sense of an undeserving person. The following discussion in Dillon v. Allen, 46 Iowa 299, 26
Am. Rep. 145, is pertinent at this point: 'The
effects of statutes which make unlawful specified
acts, upon persons violating them or aiding in
their violation are not considered in their enforcement by the courts. If one offender suffers thereby and the other gains an apparent benefit, no
arguments can be drawn therefrom for suspending the operation of the law. This is an incident
in the administration of justice against which
neither Legislatures nor the courts can provide.
The party suffering, being in delicto, cannot complain of the operation of the law, for he merits
the punishment prescribed for its violation. It
cannot he said that the law confers upon the other
a benefit because of his violation of its provisions.
What he gains comes to him as a punishment 0f
the other party, not as a reward to himself.' If
the defendant herein were attempting to build for
himself an affirmative case upon the alleged forfeiture, the question of his desert and the fact
that he was not a party to the adjudication would
be a more important consideration.''
The plaintiff then contended that the rights "acquired by the marriage" referred to in the statute are
those rights and obligations otherwise owed to the "guilty
party" by his spouse, the forfeiture of which would inure
to the benefit of such spouse alone. The court said that
the effect of this construction would be to obliterate "this
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part of the statute" and to leave it without any function
whatever. The court then made reference to other .:;ections of the statute, permitting questions of alimony and
the custody of children to be determined by the court .in
each given case. Reference was also made to the right
of dower, which under the Iowa statute is terminated by
mere force of the decree of divorce, and that the right
of either party, whether guilty or innnocent, is neither
greater nor less than the right of the other so far as the
question of dower is concerned. The court held that the
statute served no function with reference to dower or to
alimony, or to the custody of the children, and as against
the suggestion that the statute was enacted at a time
when the rule of the common law was in doubt, and that
it was intended only to be declaratory of the common law
as to the effect of the decree of divorce in determining
the right of dower, the court stated that the statute inlposes a forfeiture upon the "guilty party" alone.
"If it were intended to determine only the
question of dower, its clear implication would be
that no forfeiture was imposed upon the innocent
party in that respect; whereas the rule of the
common law as announced by this court in its
early cases holds dower to be barred to either
party, whether guilty or innocent. * * * It is
our conclusion, therefore, that we cannot hold
this provision of the statute to be merely declaratory of the common law and as mere surplusage.'~
It was urged that the application of the statute would
be a violation of the constitution in that it deprived
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the plaintiff of a vested right of property without due
process of law. The court held that this was not tenable.
"The statute provides for no forfeiture except after due process of law. The divorce proceeding resulting in a decree constituted due
process of law. It was none the less so because
defendant made default. The statute gave to him
full warning as to the consequences in case of
an adverse decree. Possibly the very purpose of
the statute was to discourage default and to encourage a contest and a presentation thereby of
the point of view of both parties. This would aid
the court in ascertaining the real truth .and would
operate to the public interest."
Particular stress was laid upon the proposition that
a decree of divorce is binding as ·an adjudication only
as between the parties thereto and that it is not binding
as between either party and a third party. It was argued
that the plaintiff had the right to plead by reply, that
the allegations of the petition in the divorce case were
false and that the findings were not in fact true. lie
·averred that he was not in fact the guilty party, although
the decree found him so, and that he was not guilty of
the acts of cruelty charged against him in the decree.
He contends in the alienation case for his right to contradict the decree as between him and the defendant. As to
this the court said:
''The general rule that an adjudication is
binding as such only upon the parties to the litigation and their privies may be taken for granted.
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ing exceptions which we will not stop now to note.
The difficulty with applying such rule to a divorce
case is that, Vn, the eyes of the law, the parties to
the case .are not the only parties in interest in the
litigation. In ordinary litigation, the parties to
the case may waive proofs and concede facts and
stipulate for judgment. In such a case the court
may properly grant to plaintiff all the relief which
is not resisted by the defendant. In a divorce
case, the court is charged with a special duty toward the public. It must look beyond the wishes
of the parties. It must often ignore admissions
and be watchful against collusions, and must ascertain as near as may be the very truth, even
though it result in the defeat of the mutual wishes
of both parties. Unless the real facts as the court
shall find them from the evidence justify a divorce
under the law, then it must be r.efused, even
though both parties desire it. In such a case, the
court is dealing with something more than the
private rights of the parties to the case. The marriage to be dissolved is "YYAot a mere contr-act, b1,tt
is a status. In such stat11s, the public interest
is invol.ved in a very sensit.ive way. A decree of
divorce dissolves not only the marriage contract,
but changes the status of the parties and thereby
their relation to the public as well as to each other.
The binding force of such decree necessarily enters into the future relations of the parties, not
only as between themselves, but affects also their
rel-ations with third parties. The parties to the
case may enter into other marriages and the
validity or voidability of such marriages, as the
case may be, must necessarily depend upon the
validity of the decree of divorce. If a third party
may not rest upon the verity of a decree of divorce, then it must logically follow that such de-
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cree has not been effective to establish or to
change the status of the parties thereto. If we
were to adopt the theory of the appeUee in this
respect, it would de,epen the mire through which
the adm.inistnation' of the divorce law is too often
drawn. The burden laid upon the courts to administer this law strictly according to its very
spirit is necessarily an onerous one in default
cases. False testimony may be adduced. Important facts may be withhheld. The defaulting defendant offers the court no aid. Too often he desires that a decree of divorce be entered. It is,
therefore, always possible that a decree be found
upon false testimony be the judge diligent as he
may. If, therefore, a defendant thus willingly obtain his freedom from the marriage bond, either
by collusion or by silence at the trial, there is
much reason why the adverse findings of the decree against him should bind him for all time.
Such a rule would tend at least to deter the evil
practice. On the other hand, if he may temporarily assent to frtlsehood either by collusion or
silence in order to enable a decree of divorce to
be ohtained, .and then afterwards in his freedom
from the bond, repudiate to his own advantage
the facts upon which the decree of dissolution
was entered, such a rule can tend only to the great
reproach of the administration of the law." (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff contended that the decree of divorce was
obtained not only upon false allegations in the divorce
petition but that it was obtained by collusion between
the parties thereto, and that it is void as between the
parties themselves. The testimony in the case is said to
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be undisputed that the plaintiff, husband, counseled with
and employed the attorney who brought the divorce suit
for the wife against him.
"We do not think this fact aids the plaintiff
in the present action. On the contrary, it furnishes an additional reason why he should be forbidden to show to his own advantage the falsity of a
decree which he collusively obtained. It is abhorrent to the judicial sense and subversive of legal
morals that a defendant may aid the plaintiff in
obtaining the solemn conclusions of the court in
the form of a decree of divorce and may afterwards, in another action in the same court, flout
the decree before the jury, and say, 'Gentlemen,
this is all false. The judge did the best he could,
but we wanted the decree and we fooled him. I
have never asked to set aside the decree and I
do not ask it now. I only want you to say that
its findings are not true in fact, and that I was
never guilty of any of the charges sustained
against me.'
* * * *
"We reach the conclusion that the general
rule that an adjudication is binding only upon the
parties thereto and their privies is not applicable
to a divorce decree as broadly as to an ordinary
adjudication which involves only private rights.
Without attempting to define an exact rule applicable in all cases to divorce decrees, we reach
the conclusion tha:t under the undisputed showing
in this case the plaintiff cannot be heard in this
action to impeach the verity of the decree of divorce nor to deny the grounds upon which the
decree was obtained, for the purpose of avoiding
the statutory forfeiture; and he must be conclu-
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sively deemed to be the 'guilty party.' For cases
bearing upon the question, see Karren v. Karren,
25 Utah 87, 69 Pac. 465, 60 L.R.A. 294, 95 Am. St.
Rep. 815; Ellis v. Ellis, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N. W.
1056, 23 L.R.A. 287, 43 Am. St. Rep. 514; Moor
v. Moor, (Tex. Civ. App.) 63 S.W. 347; Gordon
v. Dickison, 131 Ill. 141, 23 N.E. 439; Orth v. Orth,
69 Mich. 158, 37 N.W. 67."
The court distinguishes between its previous case of
Wood v. M,athews, 47 Iowa 409, a case involving criminal
conversation, .and holds that a case of simple alienation
by alleged acts and arts not in themselves criminal is
essentially different in its nature from an action for
criminal conversation, although both contain some elements in common, and, therefore, did not overrule the
Wood v. Mathews case. The court states that no case
had been brought to its attention from any state wherein
a "guilty party" in a divorce decree ever maintained an
action for damages for simple alienation of affection as
distinguished from criminal conversation. By way of
conclusion the court stated:
"Finally our conclusions may be summed up
in brief form as follows: (1) That the right of
action for damages for alienation of affection is a
'right acquired by the marriage' within the meaning of section 3181 of the Code. That by the terms
of this statute 'the guilty party' forfeits such
right. (2) That the forfeiture declared by the
statute must be recognized by the court regardless of any advantage resulting thereby to any
defendant. This is so not because of any affirmative right conferred on the defendant, but because
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of the absence of right in the plaintiff. And the
forfeiture is properly pleadable as such by a
defendant. (3) That the decree of divorce shown
in this record fixed the status of the plaintiff
herein as the 'guilty party' therein within the
meaning of said section 3181. The question at this
point is not so much whether the decree is conclusive as between plaintiff herein and third parties, and as affecting alleged affirmative rights
of such third parties, but whether the decree is
conclusive upon the plaintiff himself as bringing
him within the operation of the statute in question. We hold it to be conclusive upon plaintiff
in the latter respect, and that he became there'by
subject instanter to the forfeiture declared by
the statute. (4) That plaintiff's plea that the
divorce was obtained by his own collusion will not
avail to relieve him from its conclusiveness while
it remains in force. ( 5) We recognize that our
conclusions herein are not in harmony with the
result announced in Wood v. ::Mathews, 47 Iowa
409. In that case, however, the statute under consideration was not brought to the attention of the
court either by pleading or argument, nor did the
court assume to construe the statute nor to pass
upon it in any way. It was manifestly overlooked
both by counsel and court. The point was decided
without discussion and erroneously based upon
two supposed precedents which were not such in
fact. Under these circumstances we would not
be justified in ignoring the statute under the authority of the Wood case."
The court then calls attention to the fact that the
views expressed are the views of the majority of the
court and that an ''emphatic and permeated with feeling"
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dissent is made by the minority court. In view of the
dissents the court reiterates:
'~Of course, in view of the fact that the majority opinion is based upon our statute, the question
of outside authorities is not controlling, although
appropriate. And in view of the claim made in
the dissent that the majority puts the statute to
an 'unholy service' and operates as a protection
to 'infamy,' and in view of the call that is made
upon the Legislature for relief from the operation of the statute as so contrued, an examination
of the authorities outside of Iowa is quite interesting. What is disclosed thereby~ There are divorces abundant and too many. There are alienation suits-hundreds of them; perhaps thousands.
By whom have these alienation suits been maintained~ Those maintained by the 'guilty party'
after divorce can be counted on the hand, with a
margin to spare. In no less than 40 states such a
suit by the 'guilty party' is unknown to their reports. And this, too, in the absence of statute in,
most of such states. Is this a record of infamy~
'The absence of precedent is precedent.' Thomas
v. Adams Ex. Co., 1 Pennewill (Del.) 142, 39 Atl.
1015.

"Without pressing the query whether the call
for legislative relief, above referred to, does not
put a dissenting opinion to an inappropriate function, it is sufficient to say now that the question
of the propriety of the statute lies wholly within
the legislative judgment. While the statute remains it must be given effect by the court. It is
too definite and substantial to be blown away by
mere indignation or to be reduced to ashes by heat
of denunciation.
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"The statement of the dissent that the holding of the majority is made to depend 'upon a supposed rule of public policy or by some species of
estoppel' is not accurate nor quite fair. The majority holding is based upon the sta,tute and upon
that alone as all-sufficient. The only question of
public policy involved is that of the statute; and
the only question of estoppel involved is that
which inheres in the decree of divorce. These
particular tern1s are not used in the majority opinion, but originate in the dissent. The extended
discussion on these subjects is largely based upon
a mistaken construction of the majority holding.
Much of it is not fairly applicable to the majority
holding, but is a deflection of the argument toward an improvised target. In so far as the legislative policy involved in the statute is called in
question, we defend it as appropriate and sound."
It seems to us that the Hamilton case logically
answers every argument that can be made on behalf of
the plaintiff on the controlling effect of our statute. We
have in the instant case the words of Vera herself that
she lost all respect for her husband by reason of his conduct during the marriage, and we have a finding of the
court to that effect. The alleged causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the loss of Vera's
affections for her former husband is completely dissipated by the divorce decree itself and the adjudication
thereby that the plaintiff herein was the guilty party in
such regard. 'ro give the statute the effect clearly intended by the Legislature will do much, as suggested
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by the Iowa court, to lessen rather than deepen the mire
through which the administration of the divorce law is
too often drawn.
(b) BY REASON OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE.

In 27 Am. Jur., Husbamd and' Wife, Section 553, page
153, it is said :
"In an action for alienation of affections or
criminal conversation, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the elements of his cause of action.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show
that the defendant was the active, inducing cause
of any alleged loss or alienation of affections.''
It is recognized that there are three elements in a
cause of action for alienation of affections: (1) Wrongful conduct of the defendant; (2) loss of affection or
consortium; and (3) a causal connection between such
conduct and loss. 27 Am. Jur., Husband and wife, Section 553, page 125. The evidence with reference to the
divorce proceedings and Vera's testimony thereat was
all introduced in plaintiff's case in chief. Such evidence
was before the court at the time of the 1notion for directed verdict. The clear implication therefrom that Vera's
loss of affection for her former husband was occasioned
by her husband's lack of consideration for her and not
occasioned by anything said or done by the defendant
was not dispelled or dissipated by the plaintiff's evidence. We submit that the evidence conclusively s·hows
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that the loss of affection was because of the acts and
conduct of the plaintiff herein and not otherwise. In
Wilson v. Oldroyd, supra, it is said:
"Mrs. Wilson was both willing and anxious
to testify for Dr. Oldroyd and against the plaintiff. Actually she was permitted to testify fully
as to difficulties in her married life with plaintiff, the absence of conveniences in their home,
her husband's lack of consideration for her, and
that she had lost all affection for him before the
doctor entered her life, which evidence, if bel.ieved,
would have sustained defendamt' s contm'lltion that
there were no affections to alienate." (Emphasis
added.)
In the instant case the environment that Vera was
subjected to in the sense that Sadleir's mother was directly across the street, Sadleir's brother directly to the
North and the neighborhood situation, as reflected by the
testimony of Mrs. Arbogast, Mrs. Oakley and Mrs.
Oakley's daughter, Mrs. Torgerson, could understandably become intolerable. It is all reflected in the court's
findings in the divorce case and in Vera's testimony at
that hearing, along with the fact that Sadleir permitted
family interference in the marriage and that Sadleir
refused his wife's repeated requests to seek another
residence. There is no testimony in this case showing
that the cause for Vera's loss of affections was other
than as reflected in her testimony at the divorce hearing
and as found by the court in its findings in connection
therewith. Vera was not called as a witness in the instant
case and we submit that the state of her affections cannot
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be shown by the conversations between the plaintiff and
defendant or by the petty events narrated by the neighbors where the plaintiff's testimony affirmatively shows
that Knapton had the free run of the home, was always
a welcome guest and was looked upon a.s a brother in his
relationship to the pla:intiff. Plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proof of a causal connection between
the loss of affection of his former wife and the alleged
conduct of Knapton.
This Court in the Oldroyd case, with reference to instructions of the trial court, holds that the plaintiff has
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the wrongful acts or conduct on the part of the defendant were the controlling cause of inducing the plaintiff's wife to withdraw her affections from the plaintiff
when it said:
"It is true that there may be great or little
affection and .that the damages should be proportionate to that which is taken away from the husband. In other instructions the court amply safeguarded the defendant's theory in regard thereto by expressly so advising the jury. He also
instructed, 'If the acts or conduct of the plain tiff
himself, or any other cause than the acts of the
defendant constituted the controlling cause, * 11= *'
of plaintiff's loss of affections, then he could not
recover, and conversely told the jury that the
same would be true 'if the plaintiff's wife fell in
love with defendant without any affirmative inducement or encouragement from the defendant
* * *.' And further, 'in any event you should not
hold the defendant liable unless you find from a
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preponderance of the evidence that the wrongful
acts or conduct on the part of the defendant were
the controlling cause of inducing the plaintiff's
wife to withdraw her affection from the plaintiff.'
The instructions viewed as a whole, fully and
fairly presented defendant's various theories of
defense and were in no way prejudicial to him."
2. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE JURY.
(a) IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE
STATE OF PLAINTIFF'S FEELINGS AS AFFECTING THE
CHIILDREN.

In instruction number 13 (R. 127) the court instructed the jury in part as follows:
''You should consider the state of feelings
existing between the plaintiff and his wife prior
to the acts complained of, the nature of their
family life, the number and age of their children,
the probability or improbability of the continuance of their association as husband and wife, and
whether the plaintiff suffered much or little because of defendant's acts."
Exception was taken to the aborve (R. 107), at which
time it was stated, in effect, that the plaintiff's wife secured a divorce from him, that this court, or a division
of this court, had jurisdiction of the subject matter of
that action, of the parties and of the minor children and
that it was by the action of the court in a suit in which
the present defendant was not named that the plaintiff
in this action was deprived of the custody of his children
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and not by anything that the defendant can be chargeable
with having done, the plaintiff having defaulted as the
defendant in the divorce action.
Sadleir sat in the courtroom and permitted the
custody of his children to be awarded to Vera without
protest, and now he turns around and says that Knapton
was responsible for the action of the court. If there was
ever a time that a man should speak, believing himself
to be wronged and having a deep attachment for his children, it was in the divorce proceedings. Thirty days
later he attempted to put a price tag on the loss of the
society of his children. The philosophy so artfully expressed in the case of Ham.ilton v. McNeill is understandable. It is indeed "abhorent to the judicial sense and
subversive of legal morals that a defendant may aid the
plaintiff in obtaining the solemn conclusions of the court
in the form of a decree of divorce and may afterwards,
in another action in the same court, flout the decree before the jury, and say, " 'Gentlemen, this is all false.
The judge did the best he could, but we wanted the decree
and we fooled him. I have never asked to set aside the
decree .and I do not ask it now. I only want you to say
that its findings are not true in fact, and that I was never
guilty of any of the charges sustained against me.'"
It was the action of the court in the best interests of
the ~hildren that deprived Sadleir of the custody of the
children and not the action of Knapton. The prejudicial
effect of the instruction is apparent when one contemSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plates the argument of articulate counsel playing upon
the heartstrings of human emotions in centering attention upon the children with the aid of the court's instruction.
(b) IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

Instruction number 14 (R. 128) and excepted to (R.
107) has to do with punitive damages. Punitive damages
were awarded in the Oldroyd case. This Court held them
to be excessive, ordered a reduction of the verdict and
stated the general rule with respect to such damages as
follows:
"Punitive damages are awarded on the theory
that it is permissible in case of certain aggravated
wrongs to permit the private litigant, in the public
interest, to impose a penalty upon the defendant
as a punishment and to deter others from engaging in similar offenses. * * *
"There is no definite formula or basis upon
which punitive damages can be computed. They
have to fall within the limits of reason; 'must not
be so disproportionate to the injury and to the
actual damage as to plainly manifest that they
were the result of passion and prejudice' and
must be correlated with the other facts and circumstances shown in evidence including defendant's wealth."
In the instant case Knapton was like one of the
family. His society was courted by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff and his wife never had any words or criticism
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concerning his conduct. 'Sadleir testified, when asked if
Vera withdrew her affection from him between May of
1953 and December of that year, that she was "a little
mopy at times, but, then, that was the same as she always
had been. I thought we had a happy family." There is
nothing in the record that shows "wilful and intentional
acts and conduct" on the part of the defendant or that
entitled the jury to consider whether "the actions of defendant were perpetrated wilfully and with gross and
wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights" or that he acted
''with wantonness and positive misconduct, manifesting
a conscious disregard for the rights of plaintiff and a
reckless indifference to the consequences," the established law of the case by the court's instruction under 14.
On the 8th day of January, 19'54, when the marriage
had already fallen apart, the defendant told the plaintiff
that he lorved Vera and would support her during the time
that it took to get a divorce and would pay for the same.
A day or so before the defendanat told the plaintiff if
Sadleir could make a home of it he would he willing to
back out and get out of it. This kind of talk, in light of
all the circumstances of the case, does not spell out the
wantonness and "positive misconduct" that the instruction refers to. Sadleir could not nor did he adduce any
evidence whatsoever to justify the giving of instruction
number 14. By the giving of the instru0tion the jury was
permitted to speculate to the prejudice of the defendant
upon matters that just did not exist and the evidence did
not merit.
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3. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

The motion (R. 136) was based upon the grounds
o.f excessive damages, insufficiency of evidence, that
the verdict is against law and error in law, particularly
in the instructions to the jury, and are points that have
been heretofore suggested and argued, except perhaps
for the question of excessive damages.
Again we refer to the Oldroyd case where the court
reduced the amount of punitive damages. But in the
instant case there is not even proof as to the earning
capacity of the defendant, to say nothing of the value of
his accumulations, if any. The amount of $8000.00 as
compensatory damages and $2000.00 as punitive damages, when viewed in connection with the record in this
case, could not have been o,ther than the result of passion
and prejudice. Only six of the eight jurors concurred
in the verdict (R. 134-A). Be that as it may the result
that was reached could not help but have been an arbitrary and emotional one without consideration to the
realties of the situation and plaintiff's passive role in the
divorce proceedings. The mere fact that the jury was
able to speculate upon plaintiff's feelings with regard to
the alleged loss of society of his children is sufficient,
we believe, to demonstrate the emotional aspect of the
verdict and that it should not be allowed to stand.
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CONCLUSION
The Missouri court persists in treating a wife as a
chattel. The case of DeFord v. J oh!nson avoids the statute on the basis that the husband has a vested property
right in his wife's affections that the statute does uot
forfeit in the event of a divorce. The Iowa court rationalizes the statute as an expression of public policy requiring the husband to test the truth and merit of his position in the divorce court and to suffer the full consequences of forfeiture of all rights acquired by the marriage if he be .adjudged the guilty party. The Utah statute, identical with that of Iowa, gives this Court an opportunity to strike down this kind of litigation, under the
circumstances as we find them here, otherwise the guilty
party in the divorce action is guilty in name only and
can judicially ridicule the divorce decree. The Iowa rule
gives full effect to the Legislative mandate. Missouri
dilutes the statute.
Aside from the statute the plaintiff has wholly failed to sustain his burden of proof that Knapton alienated
Vera's affections. Plaintiff's own evidence conclusively
shows Vera's state of mind to have been brought about
by the plaintiff's own conduct and his lack of attention
to the fundamentals of a healthy marriage relationship.
There were no affections to be alienated.
The plaintiff in this case, who sat mute in the divorce
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dren and the divorce to Vera, should not, in common
decency, be now permitted to say that Knapton and not
himself was the cause of his alleged distress. We contend
that the obviously emotional judgment should not stand
either as a reward to the plaintiff or to salve his allegedly wounded feelings or as compensation for the position
that he gave up without protest, except for the simple
statement to Knapton that he did not "think it was
right."
The judgment appealed from should be reversed
and the cause remanded with such instructions as to this
Court seem proper.
Respectfully yours,

GUSTIN, RICHARDS &

MATTSSO~

At.torneys for Defendarnt and Appellant
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